Player 2 | |||
Player 1 | Left | Mid | Right |
Up | 1,0 | 1,2 | 0,1 |
Down | 0,3 | 0,1 | 2,0 |
In the Game above, none of the players has a Dominant Strategy. However, for Player 2, "Right" is Strictly Dominated by "Mid." Thus there is no reason why Player 2 would prefer "Right" over "Mid" at any point in game. So we cross out "Right" leaving us with only "Left" and "Mid" for player 2.
| Player 2 | ||
| Player 1 | Left | Mid |
| Up | 1,0 | 1,2 |
| Down | 0,3 | 0,1 |
Now since player 1 has "Down" Strictly Dominated by "Up", we cross out "Down" leaving us with only
Player 2 | ||
Player 1 | Left | Mid |
Up | 1,0 | 1,2 |
Under this condition, the best strategy for Player 2 is "Mid" giving his a payoff of "2" rather than "0" if he chooses "Left". Thus the unique solution for the game is (Up, Mid) giving a Payoff = (1,2) which is a Strictly Dominated IEDS Equilibrium. Note, it is Strictly Dominated Solution because all the strategies that were Eliminated were Strictly Dominated. If any one of them had been "Weakly Dominated", then the Equilibrium would be called "Weakly Dominated IEDS Equilibrium"
